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We define cheat sensitive cryptographic protocols between mistrustful parties as protocols which
guarantee that, if either cheats, the other has some nonzero probability of detecting the cheating. We
describe an unconditionally secure cheat sensitive non-relativistic bit commitment protocol which
uses quantum information to implement a task which is classically impossible; we also describe a
simple relativistic protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c
The discovery of quantum cryptography[1] and secure
quantum key distribution[2] has led to much interest in
understanding precisely which cryptographic tasks can
be guaranteed secure by physical principles. We pro-
pose here a new class of cryptographic applications of
quantum information: cheat sensitive protocols between
mistrustful parties. Either party may be able to evade
the intended constraints on information transfer by de-
viating from these protocols. However, if they do, there
is a non-zero probability that the other will detect their
cheating. Cheat sensitivity is potentially useful in any
situation where the parties, though mistrustful, have an
ongoing relationship which they value more than the po-
tential gains from a few successful cheating attempts.
We consider here cheat sensitive protocols for bit com-
mitment (BC), an important cryptographic primitive
whose potential for physically secure implementation has
been extensively investigated[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13]. We first introduce BC and briefly review what is
currently known about physical implementations.
Suppose A and B are in two different places and can
send classical messages or quantum states to one another.
In a classical BC protocol, A commits herself by giving
B information corresponding to an encryption of a bit
(either 0 or 1), in such a way that she can later decrypt
or unveil it for him if she chooses. It should be hard
(ideally, impossible) for A to change the bit or for B to
obtain any information about the bit unless and until A
chooses to unveil it for him. One possible implementation
is for A to write the bit down on a piece of paper which
she locks in a safe, and then send the locked safe to B.
To unveil the bit later, she sends B the key to the safe.
One weakness of this method is that B might be able to
open the safe unaided, for example by picking the lock,
or view its contents without opening it, for example by
magnetic resonance imaging.
In general, the commitment and unveiling follow a
prescribed protocol of information exchanges. We dis-
tinguish quantum protocols, which allow the exchange
of quantum information, from classical protocols, which
do not. We also distinguish relativistic protocols, which
assume the validity of special relativity and rely on
the impossibility of superluminal signalling, from non-
relativistic protocols, which do not. A BC protocol is
secure, modulo certain assumptions, if it includes a pa-
rameter which can be adjusted so that the probabilities
of A being able to unveil a state significantly different
from the committed state and of B being able to extract
significant information can simultaneously be made arbi-
trarily small. It is unconditionally secure within a given
physical theory if the only assumption necessary is the
validity of that theory. (Formal security definitions can
be found in, e.g., Refs. [6, 13].)
Several quantum BC schemes have been proposed
[2, 3, 4, 14]. These schemes presently offer good prac-
tical security, but in principle are insecure. Indeed, Lo-
Chau[5, 8] and Mayers[6, 7, 9] showed that no non-
relativistic quantum BC schemes can be perfectly secure
against both parties. Mayers[6, 7, 9] extended this to
prove the impossibility of unconditionally secure non-
relativistic quantum BC and to cover models in which
classical and quantum information are treated separately.
Unconditionally secure classical relativistic BC protocols
exist[11, 12]. It is conjectured that these protocols are
also secure against quantum attack.
The essential weakness in non-relativistic quantum BC
protocols highlighted by Lo-Chau and Mayers is that,
whenever B can extract no (or little) information about
the committed bit, A can (or very probably can) unde-
tectably alter the commitment from 0 to 1 or vice versa.
A separate issue in quantum protocols is that A may
commit an improper mixture of bit states[10, 13], in
which the committed bit is entangled with another state.
This is not advantageous when BCs are used in isolation
— for example, to record a secret prediction — but can
be when they are used as subprotocols for a larger task.
A BC protocol which forces A to commit a fixed clas-
sical bit, 0 or 1, is said to implement bit commitment
with a certificate of classicality (BCCC). Secure BCCC
protocols based on reasonable quantum computational
complexity assumptions might be possible[14, 15], but
no unconditionally secure BCCC protocols exist[13].
2Relativistic BC schemes[11, 12] offer the prospect of
practical unconditional security. However, they require
the maintenance of separated sites and the continual use
of communication channels between commitment and un-
veiling. For some applications these constraints may be
serious disadvantages. Hence, as unconditionally secure
non-relativistic BC is impossible, it is interesting to ex-
plore what can be achieved by non-relativistic protocols.
We show here that cheat sensitive BC can be imple-
mented non-relativistically. We also give a simple rel-
ativistic cheat sensitive BC protocol.
Defining cheat sensitivity A cheat sensitive quan-
tum BC protocol is a quantum BC protocol in which, as-
suming that the commitment will eventually be unveiled,
A cannot alter the probabilities of her revealing a 0 or
1 after the commitment without risking detection and B
cannot extract information about the committed bit be-
fore the unveiling without risking detection. Note that
by this definition the detection probabilities only need be
nonzero to imply cheat sensitivity.
Protocols If a BC is encoded by non-orthogonal
quantum states, B cannot extract information without
disturbing the states. This means he risks detection if
he later has to return the committed state. At the same
time, A risks detection if she sends one state and later
tries to claim that she sent the other. This suggests a
strategy for cheat sensitive BC. The problem is to arrange
for both parties to be simultaneously at risk of cheat
detection. Standard quantum BC methods do not work
here. For example, a protocol can not be cheat sensitive
if A tells B at revelation what the committed state was,
since B can then return a copy even if he has disturbed
the original. As we shall show, there are ways around
this difficulty.
We now describe two cheat sensitive quantum BC pro-
tocols. We take |0〉, |1〉 as orthonormal qubit states and
write |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).
Protocol 1: non-relativistic CSBC
Stage 0: the prelude. B prepares a singlet state,
|Ψ−〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉B − |1〉A|0〉B), and sends qubit A
to A. At certain stages of the protocol either party may
“challenge” this singlet. This means that the other party
must send a qubit which is supposed to be their half of
the singlet to the challenger, who can then check that the
two qubit state is indeed a singlet by measuring the rel-
evant projection. If not, there is a non-zero probability
it will fail the test.
Stage 1: the commitment. The protocol allows a simple
commitment procedure which A may use if she wishes
to commit to a definite classical bit: to commit to 0,
she prepares a qubit C chosen randomly to be either |0〉
or |−〉, each with probability 1/2; to commit to 1, she
similarly prepares either |1〉 or |+〉. Then she sends the
C qubit to B.
As usual in quantum BC protocols, A is allowed a more
general non-classical commitment, in which she instead
prepares a state |ψ〉 = ∑r=0,1,+,− |αr〉A|r〉C , where the
unnormalised states |αr〉 are orthogonal, keeps the |〉A
system under her control, and sends the |C〉 qubit to B.
We will show later that the probabilities for her unveiling
the classical bit are fixed by such a commitment, in the
sense that they cannot subsequently be altered without
cheating and risking detection.
Stage 2: the unveiling. A is first given the option of
challenging the singlet. If she does and it fails the test,
she has detected cheating. Next, whether or not she made
a challenge, she must reveal the value of the committed
classical bit (but not the qubit used to encode it). B then
has the option of challenging the singlet, if A did not. If
he does and it fails the test, he has detected cheating.
Stage 3: the game. If either party earlier challenged
the singlet, they automatically lose the game. If neither
challenged the singlet, they now each measure their sin-
glet qubit in the |0〉, |1〉 basis. B sends his result to A.
If hers is not opposite, she has detected cheating. If B
reports the result 1 then A loses the game; if 0 then B
loses.
If A loses she must reveal which state was used to en-
code the committed bit in the qubit C. B then measures
C to check it is in the state A claims. If not, he has
detected cheating.
IfB loses he must return the qubit C to A. She makes a
measurement to check it is still in the state she originally
prepared. If not, she has detected cheating.
This completes the protocol. Note that the cheating
tests detect only that someone – possibly the party car-
rying out the test – has cheated. The ambiguity here is
not a worry since, as usual in mistrustful cryptography,
the protocol is designed to protect honest parties against
cheats, not necessarily to protect one cheat against an-
other.
A party might choose to terminate early if they de-
tect the other cheating. However, we have not stipulated
this, since they might choose to continue if that seems
advantageous.
Proof of cheat-sensitivity: The security proof re-
lies on the following facts: 1) B cannot send anything
other than a half-singlet without risking failing a singlet
challenge. 2) If A or B carry out any non-trivial measure-
ment on the singlet they risk failing a singlet challenge.
If A preemptively makes her own challenge to avoid be-
ing challenged, she ensures she will lose the game, and
this forces her to make an honest commitment and un-
veiling. 3) When A and B can no longer be challenged,
they cannot advantageously use their singlet qubit in any
quantum information processing.
As we will show, these facts imply that the singlet can
be effectively factored out from the rest of the protocol
and merely acts to provide a random “loser” in the game.
Neither party can be certain they will not lose the game.
This prevents them from cheating: A may have to tell
B what state the qubit C is in when this qubit is in B’s
hands, and B may have to return the qubit C to A in its
original state.
Clearly, at any stage, A and B can apply a reversible
local unitary operation to the quantum states under their
3control without fear of detection. We take this as under-
stood below, rather than repeating the phrase “up to a
local unitary operation” at each stage, since applying a
local unitary does not per se gain a cheat anything.
To begin the proof, note that B must prepare a singlet
and send half of it to A, since Amay challenge the singlet.
The following lemma shows that once A and B share the
singlet neither of them can carry out nontrivial quantum
operations on it.
Lemma 1. Suppose that A and B share a state
|Ψ−〉AB|ψ〉AB , where |Ψ−〉AB ∈ H2a ⊗ H2b and |ψ〉AB ∈
Hma ⊗Hnb , so that A’s subsystem lies in HA = H2a ⊗Hma
and B’s in HB = H
2
b ⊗Hmb . Here Hda and Hdb denote d-
dimensional quantum systems initially under A’s and B’s
control respectively. Suppose A applies a quantum mea-
surement, defined by Kraus operators Ei corresponding
to outcomes i, on HA and then returns the H
2
a qubit to
B. If it is the case that, for all values of the measurement
outcome i, B now possesses the singlet |Ψ−〉 in H2a ⊗H2b ,
then the Kraus operators Ei must take the form I ⊗ E′i,
where the E′i define Kraus operators for a quantum op-
eration on Hma .
Proof. Ei ⊗ IB|Ψ−〉AB|ψ〉AB = |Ψ−〉AB|ψi〉AB.
As Ei ⊗ IB|0〉a|1〉b|ψ〉AB = |0〉a|1〉b|ψi〉AB and Ei ⊗
IB |1〉a|0〉b|ψ〉AB = |1〉a|0〉b|ψi〉AB, linearity implies that
Ei acts as the identity on H
2
a . QED.
This implies that, unless A challenges the singlet her-
self before revealing her classical bit, any strategy by
which she generates the classical bit value sent to B can-
not involve nontrivial operations on her singlet qubit.
Similarly, any strategy by which B extracts classical in-
formation before A’s unveiling cannot involve non-trivial
operations on his singlet qubit.
Now consider an honest A and dishonest B. For B
to cheat successfully, he must extract some information
about the committed bit before the unveiling. We have
established that he cannot perform any operations on his
singlet qubit before the classical bit is unveiled. Thus he
must restrict his attention to qubit C up to this point. B
would like to know, before the unveiling begins, whether
the committed state is |0〉 or |−〉 corresponding to a 0 or
|1〉 or |+〉 corresponding to a 1. The most general way
he can extract information is to introduce an ancilla |P 〉,
apply a unitary operation U1, and then measure part of
the system, creating the state
U1|P 〉|r〉C =
∑
i
cir|i〉|ηir〉 (1)
where r = 0, 1,+,−. B measures onto the states |i〉
(which are orthonormal). For outcome i he will possess
the state |ηir〉. When A declares the committed bit in
step 1 of the unveiling B will know he has one of two
states. However, there is no deterministic algorithm for
decreasing the overlap between two states.
We first assumeB makes no nontrivial use of his singlet
qubit after A’s unveiling, B must thus ensure that
|〈ηi0|ηi−〉| ≤ |〈0|−〉| and |〈ηi1|ηi+〉| ≤ |〈1|+〉| (2)
so he can send the correct state to A in stage 3 if he loses
the game. We will now see that under these conditions
B can extract no information about the commitment be-
fore unveiling. Consider applying the controlled unitary
operator U2 =
∑
i |i〉〈i| ⊗ U i to the RHS of (1), where
U i|ηi0〉 = |0〉 , U i|ηi−〉 = ai|0〉 − bi|1〉 ,
and without loss of generality (redefining |ηi−〉 by a phase
factor if necessary) we take ai and bi to be real and
positive. From (2) it follows that ai ≤ 1√
2
≤ bi. Let
U = U2U1. We have
U |P 〉|0〉 =
(∑
i
ci0|i〉
)
|0〉 (3)
U |P 〉|−〉 =
(∑
i c
i
−a
i|i〉
)
|0〉 −
(∑
i c
i
−b
i|i〉
)
|1〉 .
However, we also have
U |P 〉|−〉 = U 1√
2
|P 〉
(
|0〉 − |1〉
)
= 1√
2
(∑
i
ci0|i〉
)
|0〉+ |⊥〉
(4)
where |⊥〉 is orthogonal to the first term on the RHS
of (4). We can put |⊥〉 = α|A〉|0〉 + β|B〉|1〉 where
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1
2
. Comparing (3) and (4) we obtain
|β|2 = ∑i |ci−bi|2 ≤ 12 ≤ ∑i |ci−ai|2. Since ai ≤ bi,
this implies that ai = bi = 1√
2
for all i for which ci− 6= 0.
Hence, comparing (3) and (4) (and since we now have
α = 0) we obtain ci− = c
i
0 for all i. Also,
U |P 〉|1〉 = U |P 〉(|0〉 −
√
2|−〉) (5)
=
∑
i c
i
0|i〉(|0〉 −
√
2|−〉) =∑i ci0|i〉|1〉
Hence, |ci1| = |ci0| for all i, and similarly |ci+| = |ci−| for all
i. Thus the probability of a given outcome i cannot de-
pend on the bit committed, and so no information about
that bit can be extracted without B risking detection.
Now we need to exclude the possibility of B cheating
without risk of detection by extracting classical informa-
tion from A’s commitment qubit and then carrying out
some nontrivial operation on that qubit and his singlet
qubit between the unveiling and the game. The most
general state A and B may share just after unveiling is
|Ψ−〉AB(|α1〉A|ψ1〉B + |α2〉A|ψ2〉B), where the first state
is the as yet undisturbed singlet and the second is a state
entangling two of A’s orthogonal control states |αi〉 with
two normalised states |ψi〉 resulting from B’s actions on
the two states (say |0〉, |−〉) corresponding to A’s unveil-
ing c-bit. If B has extracted useful information, we have
|〈ψ1 |ψ2 〉| > |〈 0 | − 〉| . B must now generate a bit to tell
A whether or not he will challenge, and without loss of
generality we can assume he does so by applying a local
unitary operation to create a qubit |〉c which is sent to A,
where |0〉c and |1〉c declare respectively no challenge and
a challenge. Considering the constraints on B implied by
the protocol, given that he wishes to avoid any risk of
4cheating detectably, we see the unitary operation must
implement a map of the form:
|Ψ−〉AB(|α1〉A|ψ1〉B + |α2〉A|ψ2〉B)|∗0〉c → (6)
|∗1〉AB(|α1〉A|0〉B + |α2〉A|−〉B)|1〉c
+|0〉A|1〉B|∗2〉AB|0〉c
+|1〉A|0〉B(|α1〉A|0〉B + |α2〉A|−〉B)|0〉c ,
where |∗i〉 are unspecified states. Considering the com-
ponents of |1〉A|αi〉A in this equation, we see that in par-
ticular the unitary operation must deterministically map
states with overlap |〈ψ1 |ψ2 〉| to states with overlap no
greater than |〈 0 | − 〉|. That is, it must deterministically
decrease the overlap, which is impossible.
Now consider an honest B and a dishonest A. The
most general thing A can do initially is entangle the
qubit C with some ancilla A which she keeps. Then the
entangled state she prepares can be written as |ψ〉 =∑
r=0,1,+,− |αr〉A|r〉C . The states |αr〉A need not be nor-
malized, nor do we impose at this stage that they are
orthogonal. Further, since the states |r〉 form an over-
complete basis, the states |αr〉 need not be unique. We
will show that, if A is to be certain of not being caught
cheating, then there must be some way of writing the ex-
pansion above such that states |αr〉 are indeed orthogonal
(if they have non-zero norm). To see this consider what
happens at the unveiling stage. A must announce the
committed classical bit to B. The most general thing
she can do is perform a unitary operation on A of the
form
|αr〉A −→
∑
k=0,1
|βrk〉A′ |k〉A′′ (7)
and measure on A′′ to extract a bit, k = 0, 1, which she
sends to B as the committed classical bit. At this stage A
may have already challenged the singlet in which case she
has lost the game and must tell B what the state of the
qubit C is. Alternatively, she may not have challenged
the singlet. Then B may challenge the singlet. If he
declines he can immediately measure his singlet qubit in
the |0〉, |1〉 basis. He may get a 1 in which case A loses
the game and must tell B what the state of qubit C is.
A’s singlet qubit will, in this case, be collapsed into a
definite pure state and, hence, is of no use to A in any
cheat strategy. In the case where A gets k = 0 she must
be able to collapse the qubit C onto either |0〉 or |−〉 by
making a measurement on A′ and hence we must have∑
r=0,1,+,−
|βr0〉|r〉 = |u〉|0〉+ |u⊥〉|−〉 (8)
where 〈u|u⊥〉 = 0 and, similarly, for the k = 1 case, we
must have ∑
r=0,1,+,−
|βr1〉|r〉 = |v〉|0〉+ |v⊥〉|−〉 (9)
where 〈v|v⊥〉 = 0. This means that we can write ÛA ⊗
ÎC |ψ〉 = |1˜〉A|0〉C+|2˜〉A|−〉C+|3˜〉A|1〉C+|4˜〉A|+〉C , where
|1˜〉A = |u〉A′ |0〉A′′ , etc., and ÛA is the unitary operator
mentioned above that Amay apply at the unveiling stage.
The states |˜i〉 are orthogonal. The probabilities that A
declares a 0, 1 are given by
p0 = 〈1˜|1˜〉+ 〈2˜|2˜〉 , p1 = 1− p0 , (10)
As the states |˜i〉 are orthogonal, we have
p0 = Tr(ρCσC)− 12 , p1 = 1− p0 , (11)
where ρC = TrA(|ψ〉〈ψ|) and σC = |0〉C〈0|C + |−〉C〈−|C .
Since these probabilities only depend on the reduced den-
sity matrix of the qubit C which is in B’s hands, there
is nothing A can do to alter them once she has sent this
qubit to B at the commitment stage. Hence we see that,
if she is to be certain of avoiding being detected cheating,
she cannot alter the probabilities of declaring a 0 or a 1.
Protocol 2: relativistic CSBC We now describe a
simple relativistic cheat sensitive BC protocol. A and B
agree two non-orthogonal commitment states, |ψ0〉 and
|ψ1〉, corresponding to commitments of 0 and 1. A sends
B the state corresponding to her commitment. When
A is ready to unveil, she and B set up two extra sepa-
rated sites, A1 and B1 relatively near the main sites A
and B which they occupy, and A2 and B2 further away,
with the separations such that d(A,B) ≈ d(A1, B1) ≈
d(A2, B2) << d(A,A1) << d(A,A2). Each party can
verify these separations by timing the receipt of mes-
sages, so no trust is required here[16]. A2 then reveals
the committed bit to B2. Before this information can
reach A,B,A1 and B1, these four carry out a relativistic
coin tossing protocol[16]. If they obtain a 0, B returns
the commitment state to A for testing; if a 1, B keeps it
and tests it once B2 has informed him of A2’s revelation.
Discussion Quantum information allows us to im-
plement unconditionally secure cheat sensitive BC by
relatively simple protocols, which will easily be imple-
mentable when the technology for quantum state storage
is developed. The mechanism for cheat sensitivity used
in these protocols relies on the properties of quantum in-
formation: classical information cannot be used in the
same way, since A cannot be sure if B has extracted
information from a classical message. It would be inter-
esting to understand how to optimise the levels of cheat
sensitivity against A and B, and to quantify the effect
of noise (which would tend to make our protocols imper-
fectly cheat sensitive).
Finally, our results suggest the possibility of cheat sen-
sitive implementations of other cryptographic tasks, such
as non-relativistic quantum multi-party computation for
general functions, for which unconditional security is not
always attainable[17]. It would be interesting to under-
stand precisely which tasks can be implemented with
cheat sensitivity.
After submitting the first version of this paper, we
learned of independent work by Aharonov et al.[18], who
define and implement a related weaker cryptographic
task, quantum bit escrow.
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